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SOM NE ASPECTS OF CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE OLD
SPANISH JURISPRUDENCE
W LLut Q. DE FUNIAK*
It is, as the courts would say, a matter of common knowledge
that Judge Story, in preparing his authoritative treatise on
Conflict of Laws, found relatively few Anglo-American cases
available and that he made an exhaustive study of the work of
many of the European juris-consults and commentators in order
to present a well-rounded survey. The necessity of such a com-
plete and well-rounded treatment of the subject, he realized, was
of present and of constantly increasing future importance in
our union of sovereign or quasi-sovereign states. Such a union
could not but present and continue to present numerous oppor-
tunities and, indeed, absolute requirement for the application
of the principles of Conflict of Laws. Working from the theories
and conclusions of these European writers, Story analyzed and
interpreted them in the light of our needs and supplied a body
of principles that long furnished our courts with the means of
solving our increasing problems in that field of law.
Of course, the very nature of the subject of Conflict of Laws
necessarily brings us in touch with the legal thought of other
countries, but Story must receive chief credit for initiating our
contact with those legal sources. A consideration of the "List of
Authors Cited" in the second edition of his work and a con-
sideration of the work itself shows that his primary recourse was
to legal Writers of the Dutch and French schools, with secondary
consideration given to German, English, Scottish and Italian
legal writers.' Incidentally, it is interesting to notice that one
American writer, Samuel Livermore, antedated Story with a
.:: LL.B., University of Virginia. Professor of Law, University of
San Francisco. Author, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON COMMUNITY PROPERTY.
'STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1841).
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brief treatise, Dissertations on the Contrariety of LawS, 2 pub-
lished in New Orleans in 1828 and dealing with the theories of
the Dutch and French legal writers. Story described it as
"learned" and generously recommended reference to it as an
excellent work.3
-Whether Story set an example which has influenced later
American writers on Conflict of Laws, or whether other causes
may be credited, American writers and jurists since his day, in
studying European legal thought on Conflict of Laws and, in
fact, on the civil law generally have seemed to pursue their
studies and researches within the confines delineated by Story.
There has, in short, been reference to almost every European
school of legal thought except the Spanish. For example, an
illustration of this may be seen in the exhaustive bibliography
of pre-nineteenth century legal writers in Professor Beale's
excellent Treatise on the Conflict of Laws. No Spanish writers
seem to be listed there. (It is otherwise, however, in his listing
of the modern legal writers. There Spain receives full repre-
sentation.) 4
Besides the already suggested reason of the example set by
Judge Story, other valid reasons may exist. The works of the
Spanish commentators and jurisconsults may not have been so
readily available as those of the Dutch and French schools.
There is also the fact that the Spanish legal writers of the
fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did
not (to my knowledge) enter upon studies confined to the prin-
ciples of Conflict of Laws. Their works were usually keyed
to the" various codifications of the Spanish law and were com-
mentaries on the codes with, however, expansion, development
and interpretation of the law generally which revolved around
the hub of the particular code. Their treatment of Conflict of
Laws principles was not to be found in independent treatises
but within the framework of their over-all discussions and com-
2 The writer has not, up to this writing, been able to put his hands
on a copy of this work. Professor Stumberg, in his PRINCIPLES OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS, p. 6, n. 16, gives the title in full as DISSERTATIONS
ON THE QUESTIONS WHICH ARISE FROM THE CONTRARIETY OF THE POSI-
TIVE LAWS OF DIFFERENT STATES AND NATIONS.
'STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws (5th ed.
1857) p. 14, n. 1, wherein Story says, "I gladly refer the reader to
these Dissertations, as very able and clear."4 BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1931) xvii.
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mentaries. However, this was equally true of many Dutch and
French legal writers whose works have been studied for their
treatment of the principles of Conflict of Laws, and has not
prevented such study.
There would seem to be no real reason why the theories and
conclusions of the older Spanish legal writers should not be of
interest to us. In fact, there are three definite reasons why they
should be. First, Spain occupies a position of deserved pre-
eminence in European legal history as the first country to bring
legal order out of the confusion brought about by the Germanic
or Teutonic conquest of the Roman Empire. As evidence of this
are some of the earliest written codes of laws of the European
continent after the fall of Rome.5 And despite eight centuries
of almost incessant warfare to break the Moorish grip on the
Iberian Peninsula, Spain produced from the thirteenth century
on a series of codes far in advance of the accomplishments of
other European countries. 6 Despite certain verbosities and other
criticizable qualities from a present-day standpoint, these codes
represent a remarkable achievement. Moreover, they were ac-
companied by an impressive and truly learned amount of legal
commentaries and dissertations. These, covering the period from
the thirteenth through the eighteenth centuries, display an ex-
haustive study of the Roman law and of the Italian and French
legal writers of past and contemporary periods.7 So far as these
Spanish legal writers considered principles of Conflict of Laws,
their conclusions deserve our attention from a standpoint, at
least, of a survey of comparative law.
The first of these seems to be the Code of Uric or Code of
Tolosa, in the year 480, a compilation of Germanic customs. Under
Euric's son Alaric appeared the Breviary of Alaric or Lex Romana
Visigothorum, approved in 506. The former was designed to govern
the Visigoths and to govern in matters between themselves and the
Hispano-Romans; the latter, based on Roman sources, was designed
to govern the Hispano-Romans. In 693, in its more or less completed
form, appeared the code variously known as Liber ludiciorum or
Forum Iudicum, or in the Castilian the Fuero Juzgo, which sup-
planted the double system of law and provided one law for all. See
VANCE, THE BACKGROUND OF HISPANIc-AmERICAN LAW (1943) 35 et
seq.; DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY (1943) sec. 22
et seq.; SCHMIDT, CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO (1851).
"E. g., Fuero Real, 1255; Las Siete Partidas, 1263; Nueva Re-
copilacion, 1567. See authorities cited, supra, note 5.
I See Rafael Attamira's article in A GENERAL SURVEY (CONTINEN-
TAL LEGAL HISTORY SERIES) 1918; Vance, loc. cit., n. 5; de Funiak, loc.
cit., n. 5; Schmidt, loc. cit., n. 5.
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Secondly, our own frequent accession of territory governed
by the Spanish law should warrant an interest in the legal
sources of Spanish law. The influences of the Spanish law
have not completely disappeared in all of that territory and
Spanish law has been resorted to, on occasion, even on Conflict
of Laws principles. It is reasonably well known now that in
several of our southwestern and far western states, the law gov-
erning marital property rights has its basis in the Spanish law.8
And the field of marital property rights is one highly productive
of problems in Conflict of Laws. It may not be so well known
that the mining law of our western states is often quite soundly
based in the Spanish and Spanish-Mexican mining law.9 'Much
of the early land law and legal problems arising from public
grants of land in those regions required consideration of Spanish
and Spahish-M1exican law.' 0 While these latter subjects are not
frequently productive of Conflict of Laws problems, they are
instanced as examples of the extent of the Spanish law in our
'American jurisprudence. Peculiarly, although the physical
nature of much of the southwest and far west resembles Spain
much more than it does England, the law of water rights appears
to owe little to Spanish law. On the other hand it frequently
owes little or nothing to the English common law, as in the field
of irrigation."
Although there have been several definable upsurges in
interest in the Spanish law, each upsurge being traceable to an
See Platt, Law as to Property Rights of Married Women (1885);
Ballinger, Community Property (1895); de Funiak, Principles of
Community Property (1943) vol. 1..
'See Foreword, RICKETTS' AMERICAN MINING LAW (STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, DIvIsIoN OF MINES) (1943); HALLECK, MINING LAWS OF
SPAIN AND MEXICO (1859); ROCKWELL, COMPILATION OF LAWS OF
SPAIN AND MEXICO IN RELATION TO MINES AND TITLES IN REAL ESTATE
(1851). Some writers attribute practically the whole basis of our
western mining law to such sourqes. Others, such as Ricketts, give
equal weight to customs developed among the miners themselves
in the early days.
" These problems contributed to bringing about the publication
of such works as JOSEPH M. WHITE'S NEW COLLECTIONS OF LAWS,
CHARTERS AND LOCAL ORDINANCES (1839) and Rockwell's work, supra,
n. 9.
"See, e.g., Austin v. Chandler, 4 Ariz. 346, 42 Pac. 483 (1895),
remarking that at common law no such thing, as an irrigating ditch
was known and that the Arizona statutes must be looked to, since
"the common law has no application whatever to the use of water
with us."
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accession of former Spanish territory, 12 none of these upsurges
of interest seems to have been accompanied by any particular
display of curiosity about Conflict of Laws in Spanish juris-
prudence. For example, after the Louisiana Purchase, in 1807,
the territorial legislature of Orleans, which in 1812 was ad-
mitted as the state of Louisiana, ordered a digest of the ancient
Spanish laws to be made;'" and later, in 1819, the legislature
of the state of Louisiana authorized at its expense a translation
of the Spanish code, Las Siete Partidas, which it recognized as
having the force of law in the state. 14 Yet, as already mentioned,
when Mr. Livermore, of New Orleans, prepared and published
in 1828 his monograph on "contrariety" of law, it seems to be
the Dutch and French legal writers and commentators to whom
lie resorted.
Thirdly, the situation in Spain over a long period of time
bears many points of similarity to our own country with its
"' Upon the purchase of Louisiana (which though purchased from
France was governed by Spanish law, de Funiak, sec. 40), there was
legislative action to make the Spanish law available in English
translations. See infra, notes 13, 14. This interest was largely local
to Louisiana, however. Upon the acquisition of Florida from Spain,
Joseph M. White was employed by Congress to investigate and report
on land titles, which led to Mr. White's preparation of a book upon
the subject in which he set out much of the Spanish law. Its publi-
cation in 1839 seems to have been somewhat influenced, also, by the
interest created by the achievement of Texan independence in 1836.
See Introduction, WHITE, NEW COLLECTION OF LAWS, CHARTERS AND
LOCAL ORDINANCES, etc. (also referred to as WHITE's NUEVA RECO-
PILACION, although he does not actually set out that code but rather
the commentaries of Asso and Manuel). After the annexation of
Texas and the acquisition of territory from Mexico in 1848, there was
a distinct upsurge of interest in Spanish and Mexican law, indicated
by such works as Schmidt, CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AmD MEXICO (1851):
ROc KWELL, COMPILATION OF SPANISH AND MEXICAN LAW (1851);
HALLECK, COLLECTION OF MINING LAWS OF SPAIN AND MEXICO (1859);
HAMILTON, MEXICAN LAW (1882); HALL, LAWS OF MEXICO (1885).
Finally, the acquisition of much former Spanish territory after the
Spanish-American War marked another period of interest in Spanish
law, as indicated by such works as WALTON, CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND
SPANISH AMERICA (1900); HOWE, STUDIES IN THE CIVIL LAW (1905),
etc. Continuing interest in and study of the Spanish law has been
shown by the late John T. Vance, Law Librarian of Congress, and
by Judge Charles Sumner Lobingier.
' The resulting civil code of 1808 has often mistakenly been sup-
posed to have been modeled on the Code Napoleon. See Introduc-
tion, LA. CIVIL CODE (DART, 1932); de Funiak, sec. 41.
"This translation, prepared by Lislet Moreau and Henry Carle-
ton, was published in 1820, with an excellent introduction by the
translators in which they give a history and description of the Span-
ish codes.
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many separate state jurisdictions. During the centuries in which
Spain, after the Mloorish conquest, was being consolidated into
one country, it was made up of many provinces and kingdoms
with varying laws, usages and customs. Accordingly, questions
of jurisdiction of the courts and of the law applicable and gov-
erning were frequently matters of importance. Even in the
paramount kingdom of Castile, the codes frequently took ac-
count of variant laws and customs in parts of that kingdom;
even as these codes began to be extended to other provinces,
their provisions were frequently made subordinate to local laws
and customs which might be different. For example, the code of
Las Siete Partidas of 126315 makes the point that although cus-
tom cannot abrogate the general law ordinarily, it may do so in
that place where the custom is practiced.16 However, definitely
by the time of the seventeenth century we find that the codes
become supreme even in the face of variant local laws or cus-
toms, and indeed express legislation, in many instances, began
to remove these variances and make the law uniform for all
parts of Spain.' 7
A consideration of conflict of laws principles may well
start with the jurisdiction of the courts, both in rem and in
personarn, and the resulting validity and conclusiveness of judg-
ments. In our own country, while it is not necessarily the first
case in point of time, we frequently start our consideration of
jurisdiction in rem and in personam with the leading case of
Pennoyer v. Neff. s While that case is not strictly a conflict of
laws case, since only one jurisdiction is involved, it definitely
has a bearing on the validity and conclusiveness of a judgment
when brought into question in another state. From that point
one. may proceed to consider what is necessary to acquire juris-
This code, compiled under the direction of Alfonso X, was
completed in 1263 according to most legal historians, in 1265 accord-
ing to others. Peculiarly, it was not officially confirmed as the law
until 1348 by the Ordinance of Alcala, although it had gained wide
prestige and authority with lawyers.
Partida I, Title II, Law 6.
Illustrative of this is the statute which expressly abolished the
local custom or law of Cordova that married women had no share in
the properties acquired during marriage and which expressly ex-
tended the marital community of property to that place as it existed
in most other parts of the country. It was carried into the NoVISIMA
RECOPILACION Of 1805 as Law 13 of Book 10, Title 4.
95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1878).
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diction by way of service of process on domiciliaries, non-resi-
dents, temporary residents, and so on.
Turning specifically to the Spanish law, we find the code
of Las Siete Partidas providing that "when a plaintiff desired
to assert his claim he should do so in the presence of a judge
who has jurisdiction over the defendant, for the defendant would
not be required to answer before another judge, except con-
cerning the matters herein enumerated, and which we shall pro-
eeed to mention." The code then proceeds to set out fourteen
bases of jurisdiction. 19 The eminent jurist, Palacios Rubeus
(or Ruvios), 20 points out that these so-called fourteen bases of
jurisdiction are commonly reducible to four, namely, domicile,
contract, delict, and the situs of the res.2 1 The later commenta-
tors Aso and IManuel, 22 in their Institutes of the Civil Law of
Spabz,23 however, prefer to define these bases in terms of seven
distinct ones.2 4 These are given as follows:
"Domicile, so that any person may be sued before the judge
of the place where he is found settled, * * * 2d, Birthplace, pro-
vided the defendant be not removed from it." It will be noticed
that while Aso and Manuel thus profess to define two separate
bases of jurisdiction, they are in fact merely stating that domi-
cile of choice and domicile of origin (which has been retained)
are the bases. Since we would consider that a domicile of origin
retained after emancipation or reaching majority becomes a
domicile of choice, we would make no particular distinction in
these two cases and would merely say that domicile affords a
basis of jurisdiction of the court.25 That, indeed, is what
Palacios Rubeus does in stating, concisely, that domicile is one
of the bases of jurisdiction. The same conciseness appears in the
"Partida III, Title II, Law 32.
"Juan Lopez de Vivero, usually known as Palacios Rubeus,
1447-1523, was successively Professor of Law at the University of
Salamanca, Supreme Judge of Valladolld and Vizcaya, and Royal
Councillor, as well as being a legal writer of recognized distinction.
21 Commentaries on law cited supra, n. 19.
22 Ignacio Jordan de Aso y Del Rio and Miguel de Manuel y
Rodriguez, famous legal commentators of the second half of the
eighteenth century, are best known for their various joint commen-
taries. Because of their frequent association the impression fre-
quently exists that they were one man.
INSTITUCIONES DEL DERECHO CIVIL DE CASTILLA.
"Aso and Manuel, INSTITUCIONES DEL DERECHO CIVIL DE CASTILLA,
Book 3, Title 2, Cap. 1.
See, e.g., BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws, Sec. 14.1.
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Manial del Abogado, America, or El Abogado Arnericano, issued
for the Spanish territories in the Americas, which states that
"a competent judge in civil causes is, 1st, the judge of the place
where the defendant is domiciled." 26
With regard to the foregoing it may be remarked that the
law made provision for personal service of process, except that
in the case of one, such as a domiciliary, considered subject to
the jurisdiction of the local courts, a substituted service was pro-
vided by leaving a summons at the defendant's house with mem-
bers of his family, and if the defendant had no house, by publi-
cation through proclamation in the market places. 27
Returning, however, to Aso and Manuel, they state as the
third basis of jurisdiction: "The place where the property is
situate although the defendant be not a resident of it, nor domi-
ciled there; but this is understood when the plaintiff institutes
a real and not a personal action."28 Subsequently, in their work,
the authors give certain definitions, pertinent here, that "The
principal division of actions, according to our jurisprudence, is
into real, personal, and mixed. By real action the dominion or
property in the thing (i.e., jus in re) is demanded or sued for;
,by personal, the right which belongs to one in virtue of any con-
tract (i.e., jus a~d ren) ; the mixed partakes of both, such as the
personal action strengthened or secured by the establishment of
a mortgage." 29 With us, we would class actions for torts as per-
sonal actions, but the Spanish law distinguished between civil
actions and delictual actions. A delict or wrong could give rise
both to a criminal prosecution for the delict and an action for
damages for the delict. The latter seems not to be considered in
the same classification as a personal action on a right arising
from contract.30 This is discussed, however, subsequently in
this article.
With regard to the right of action based on a contract, it
is somewhat startling to find Aso and Manuel announcing briefly
as the fourth basis of jurisdiction of the court "' The pla-e where
"See W T, NOVISIMA RECOPILACION, VO1. 1, p. 362.
, Partida III, Title VII, Law 1; see also NoVIsIMA RECOPn.ACION
(1805). Book 11, Title 4, Law 3.
" See supra, note 24.
Aso and MANUEL, INSTITUCIONES DEL DERECHO CIVIL DE CAS-
TILLA, Book 3, Title 4, Sec. 1.DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY, Sec. 81. And
see post, this article.
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the contract is entered into which gives rise to the suit. '" 3 1 If
tangible property which is the subject matter of the contract is
within the court's jurisdiction, the authors' statement is quite
true, because the court could proceed ib rent on the basis of its
jurisdiction over the property. The jurist, Didacus Covar-
ruvias, ' 2' in his Practicarum Quaestiomm?,33 observes justly that
for there to be competency of jurisdiction in respect to the place
of contract, it is necessary that the defendant be found in that
place at the time the action is instituted against him. There
would definitely seem to have been some conflict of views over
the nature of obligations or rights of action arising from con-
tracts. Evidently, some Spanish jurisconsults considered that
making a contract in a place produced some sort of res having
its sitis at that place so as to warrant jurisdiction by the courts
of the place. This is illustrated by the commentaries of the
jurist, Juan de MNatienzo,3 4 who asks: "What of debts and rights
of action. As to this there is great doubt. Some think they
should be reckoned as immovables, others as movables, and others
think that they are a third dnd of property.... But ... rights
of action and debts are not confined to a place and cannot be
called property situate in any place .... [Lapus] says debts are
not said definitely to be situate in a place, yet so far as regards
their effective enforcement which is only possible in a definite
place they are said to be property in that place or province.
And so, Lapus says, they belong to the place where in law and
in fact they can be enforced." Accordingly, concludes AMatienzo,
See supra, note 24.
Diego Covarruvias y Leiva, 1511-1587, styled by his contemp-
oraries the Spanish Bartolus, was Professor of Law at the University
of Salamanca, Bishop of the Roman Catholic Church, Royal Judge
and Royal Councillor.
Covarruvias, PRACTICARUM QUAESTIONUM, Cap. 1.
'Juan de Matienzo, one of the most illustrious of the Spanishjuris-consults, lived during the latter half of the sixteenth century.
Distinguished as a practitioner of law with great success, he was
also Royal Judge of Charcas and Sima and the Supreme Judge of
the Primera Audiencia. He finished his distinguished legal career
in a high administrative post in the Argentine Chancellery of the
Kingdom of Peru, where he prepared an exhaustive survey on all
aspects of colonial government with comprehensive plans for legis-
lative reforms of wide variety. It was during this period that he
published his Commentaries on the Nueva Recopilacion, the Spanish
Code of 1567. See VANCE, THE BACKGROUND OF HISPANIc-AMiERICAN
LAw (1943) 155, n. 241; DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMAUNITY
PROPERTY, vol. 2, Appendix II.
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who was considering the nature and extent of marital property
rights in certain kinds of property, the spouses' rights in debts
and rights of action must be governed by the law of the place
in which they could be enforced.35 Moreover, as to contracts
generally, "Hatienzo points out that if one enters into a con-
tract with a foreigner, knowing that he intends to return to his
own domicile, it is presumably intended that the foreigner will
perform at his domicile and according to its laws, and if he is to
be sued it must be at that place. But if the contract is entered
into with the foreigner with the intention that it be performed
where made, it will be governed by the laws of the place where
made.36 However, wherever there is a breach, it is clear, accord-
ing to the views of both Matienzo and Covarruvias, that the
foreigner cannot be sued in that place unless he is present there
at the time of the institution of the suit.
Returning to Aso and Manuel and their listing of the bases
of jurisdiction, two of the remaining three may be passed over as
not pertinent. One relates to the authority of the court to cite
before it the heir of a deceased ancestor, the other to certain
classes of society, such as clergymen and nobles, not subject to
the authority of the ordinary courts. However, the remaining
one is of interest. It is that "The commission of crime requires
the prosecution and punishment of the delinquent in the place
where he perpetrated it. ' '3 7 This is in entire accord with that
principle of conflict of laws which we recognize, that one juris-
diction will not enforce the penal laws of another jurisdiction.35
Reference has been made in the preceding paragraph to the
matter of an heir. It would not do to pass from the question
of jurisdiction without remark on the matter of administrations
and the like. Turning to the Manual del Abogado, already cited,
we may note the following statement as to competency of juris-
diction of a court "in the matters of accounts that guardians or
curators ought to give [being] where the guardianship or cilra-
torship was administered", and "in possessory causes of in-
heritance,3 9 the judge of the place where the inheritable things
-"Gloss I, Nos. 84, 85, of Commentaries to Law 2, of Book 5,
Title 9, of NUEVA RECOPILACXON of 1567.
Gloss I, No. 71, to same.
See supra, note 24.
See, e.g., The Antelope, 10 Wheat. (U.S.) 66 (1825), per Chief
Justice Marshall; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
i.e., actions to enforce the right to an inheritance.
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are; in causes where legacies are claimed, if they are specific,
the judge of the place where they are, or where the greater part
of the estate of the deceased may be, or where the heir 40 may
reside, and if they are generic or of an article which it is usual
to count, measure or weigh, the judge of the first two places in-
dicated, or the judge of the place in which the heir commenced
paying the legacies, unless the testator had designated the
place."
It is appropriate, perhaps, to ask at this point what is the
effect of a judgment rendered by a court in a cause where it
has not obtained jurisdiction. It was provided that the judg-
ment was not valid where "rendered against a party and he was
not summoned in the first place' ',41 and further "Judges some-
times oppress defendants who answer before them, although
they belong to another jurisdiction over which said judges have
no judicial authority; and in a case of that kind we decree that
every judgment rendered in this way shall not be valid. The
same rule applies where the parties make a mistake by accepting
some judge who has no authority over them.''42 Or as more
briefly stated by Aso and Manuel, "a judgment alone is valid
which is given against a person subject to the jurisdiction of the
judge. 43
It will be seen from the foregoing that the parties' mere
acceptance of a judge who had no authority over them did not
render his judgment valid. This, when viewed in the light of
certain other provisions of the Spanish law, has relation to the
same thing that we recognize, that is, that parties cannot confer
jurisdiction by mere consent. Thus, it will be recalled that
with us the courts of the matrimonial domicile do not give
effect to divorce decrees of some other jurisdiction even though
both spouses appeared and consented to the supposed authority
"Legacies could not exceed a certain proportion of the estate of
the decedent, the rest going by law to the heir or heirs; hence it
would appear that the right to or possession of the legacy might have
to be enforced against the heir. See Aso and Manuel, INsTrrucioNxs
DEL DERECHO CIVIL DE CASTILLA, Book 2, Titles 3 and 5.
1Partida III, Title XXII, Law 12.
4 Partida III, Title XXII, Law 15; SALA, ILUSTRACION DEL DERECHO
CIVIL DE ESPANA, vol. 2, Book 3, Title 2.
" Aso and MANUEL, INSTITUCIONES DEL DERECHO CIVIL DE CAS-
TILLA, Book 3, Title 8, Cap. 1.
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of the court rendering the decree.4 4 However, the Spanish juris-
prudence recognized the validity of judgments rendered where
the parties voluntarily submitted to a court having "ante-
cedently lawful jurisdiction." '45  In other words, although not
the most convenient forum, the court had the necessary power
and jurisdiction to proceed if it wished, in view of the parties'
voluntary submission. This was referred to as jurisdiction
prorogado.46
Incidentally, it may be stated that where two courts had
concurrent jurisdiction over causes of the same nature, the one
before which the cause was first instituted and by which the
defendant was lawfully cited acquired exclusive jurisdiction
over the cause to conclusion, with "preventive" powers against
the continuance of the subsequent suit.47
The effectiveness of a valid service of summons on a de-
fendant as cementing the jurisdiction of the court and rendering
its subsequent judgment valid shows little or no difference from
the principles followed in this country. Thus, where a domi-
ciliary was properly served with summons, his removal im-
mediately thereafter to some other province or district or
country, did not defeat the jurisdiction of the court and it could
validly proceed to judgment. 48 Likewise, where the defendant
was a nonresident but was served while temporarily within the
bounds of the court's jurisdiction, the court had jurisdiction to
proceed against him and render a valid judgment.49 As with
us, certain exemptions from service of process existed as to a
person coming within the confines of the court's jurisdiction to
appear as a witness in some pending cause or for certain other
specified reasons; but if while so doing he entered into any con-
tract or committed some wrong, as to such matter he was sub-
ject to suit.50
"See, e.g., Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 23 Sup. Ct. 237, 47
L. Ed. 366 (1903).
4Aso and MANUEL, INSTITUCIONES DEL DERECHO CIVIL DE CAS-
TILLA, Book 3, Title 1, Cap. 4.
" See note 45, supra; also MANUAL DEL ABOGADO, Vol. 1, see. 11.
This situation was not of common occurrence, according to Juan Sala.
" See NovisIMA RECOPILACION, Book 5, Title 14, Law 9; LAS
SIETE PARTIDAS, Partida 3, Title 7, Law 12.
'S Partida 3, Title 7, Law 12.
'Partida 3, Title 3, Law 4.
0' Partida 3, Title 3, Law 4; Partida 3, Title 7, Law 2.
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To what extent, if any, a valid judgment in one province
or district in Spain was given effect in another province or dis-
trict, I have observed no authority, but it seems probable that
occasion for such a question did not arise. In the case of a pro-
ceeding, in ,'cnm, of course, the property was usually attached or
taken possession of pending the suit and satisfaction, in part at
least, obtained therefrom.51 In a proceeding in personam, the
defendant debtor might be obliged to give security or bail and
imprisoned if he did not do so.52 Accordingly, there was little
'Jr no opportunity for him to escape the jurisdiction without
having satisfied any judgment against him.
When we turn to the principles of congfict of laws which
relate to the law applicable to determine the nature of rights
and causes of action, we find discussions relating to contract
and property matters but not to what we know as torts. This
latter is explainable by the fact, which has already been indi-
cated, that the Spanish law, following the Roman law, classed all
wrongs or injuries under the general head of delicts." True,
the Spanish law subdivided such delicts into two classes, those
termed public and those termed private. In other words, a
public offense or true crime (delito verdadero) was proceeded
agahst by what corresponded to our criminal proceeding; a
delict which caused damage to person or property gave rise to
an action for damages, in the nature of our tort action. Never-
iheles,, whether one or the other, it was based on a delict or
wrong. Thus, the attempt to bring an action for damages in one
province of Spain for a delict committed in another province or
for one committed outside the country would simply run against
the stone wall of the statutory provision that, for some delict
which had been committed, "where a suit is instituted against
him on this account he is required to answer where the delict
was committed." That was so "even though he be a native
or resident of some other country. -4 So, if the wrongdoer had
left the jurisdiction where he committed the private wrong (or
:"Aso and Manuel, INSTITUCIONES DEL DERECHO CIVIL DE CAS-
TILLA, Book 3, Title 10.
' See supra, note 51, especially Cap. 1, sec. 6 thereof.
'"The delict in the Spanish law generally, see DE FUNIAK. PRIN-
CIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY, sec. 81; Aso and MANUEL, INSTITU-
CIONES DEL DERECHO CIVIL DE CASTILLA, BooK 2, Titles 19 and 20.
'' Partida 3, Title 2, Law 32. See Aso and MANUEL, INSTITUCIONES
DEL DERECHO CIVIL DE CASTILLA, Book 3, Title 2, Cap. 1.
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tort), it would seem that no right existed to bring action against
him elsewhere and, hence, no occasion arose for developing any
principles of conflict of laws in regard to the law applicable to
determine th e existence of a right of action for tort.
In the matter of contracts, which have already been referred
to in a preceding part of this article, it appears that regardless
of where the contract was made, the place of performance was
considered to be intended to supply the law by which the rights
of the parties under the contract were to be determined. This
may be more fully seen in the dicussion following to the extent
to which it relates to marital contracts between spouses. The
following discussion, it may be remarked, is based largely on
commentaries of the jurist Matienzo,5 5 who provides many in-
teresting lights on certain aspects of conflict of laws principles
in the spanish law. 5 6 However, concurring views of other juris-
consults are also given. 57
In discussing the law that husband and wife share equally
the earnings and gains acquired during marriage, M\Tatienzo
raises the question of the effect of a different law being in force
in any state or province of the country, pointing out that in the
state of Cordova the law requiring such sharing is not in force. 8
The law of marital gains can apply only, he says, "to property
situate in the place of the husband's domicile but not to prop-
erty situate in some other place where a different custom is in
force. Property situate in Cordova will be dealt with according
to the custom of Cordova and so will not be divided.... The law
of the husband's domicile must not be considered so far as con-
cerns property owned by the spouses in other jurisdictions. Such
property is dealt with according to the law or custom of the
place where it is situate; for custom does not extend beyond its
own territory, least of all to govern property situate abroad
where different or contrary laws or customs are in force ...
See supra, note 34.
Specifically, Gloss I, Nos. 65-85, to Law 2 of Book 5, Title 9, of
the NUEVA RECOPILACION Of 1567. See de Funiak, vol. 2, Appendix
III. 5, e.g., by AZEVEDO, COMMENTARIORUM IURIS CIVILIS (1597);
GUTIERREZ, PRACTICARUM QUESTIONUM (1606-1612); LLAMAS Y
MOLINA, COMENTARIO A LAS LEYES DE TORO (1827).
-"In 1802, however, this disparity from the law of the rest of
Spain was removed and community of property between spouses
made the law. See NOVISIMA RECOPILACION (1805) Book 10, Title 4,
Law 13.
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This view is supported by many legal principles and is adopted
by the larger number of legal authorities. . . it is the general
opinion that in intestate succession regard is had to the place
where the property is situate and that it makes no difference
whether the relevant law [of the domicile] speaks in rem or in
pcrsoiam. . . . the sounder view is that whether a statute speaks
in rew or bi persozain it does not apply to property situate out-
side the jurisdiction, and that the appropriate laws are the
local customs and laws where the property is situate.'"'5 In the
foregoing discussion, Alatienzo cites many authorities at length,
including Baldus and Bartolus and others of the Italian schools,
and likewise remarks that the view given is that followed in the
kingdom of France. He makes the further point that if the law
of the spouses' domicile and the law of the place where the
property is situate are entirely contrary or opposite in effect,
the law of the domicile will certainly be so objectionable in the
jurisdiction where the property is situate as to be definitely un-
acceptable.60 In short, as we would say, the public policy of the
latter jurisdiction would constitute an important factor.
But, he continues, what about the case of movable property
acquired during marriage in a place other than the matrimonial
domicile? He points out that according to views expressed by
Baldus and many others, including Casaneus in his Con-
si chdiiaes Butrgundiae, immovables are subject to the law of the
place where situate but that movables follow the person of the
owner. "According to this view regard should always be had
to the law of the place of origin or domicile of the deceased and
not to the law of the place in which such movables are situate,
by reason of the fact that they attach to the person and not to
the place. But the contrary view is sounder and more popular,
viz.: that movable property is presumed to belong to the terri-
tory in which it is situate. This was also the view of Baldus-
contradicting himself as he often does. . . . [We may safely
infer that AMatienzo had not too high an opinion of Baldus.]
But you must understand this generally accepted rule as apply-
ing only when movable property is permanently and not merely
temporarily situate in a place. Such was the opinion of Baldus
(who never failed to lend his support to any and every opin-
M ATIENZO, COMMENTARIA, Gloss I, No. 74, to Law 2, etc.
Matienzo, No. 76.
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ion).61 . . . The reason for this is . . . that property which is
in a place for a period and is to be taken to another place is
not deemed to belong to the place where it is, but to the place
whither it is to be taken. It is not deemed to be where it is
found but rather belongs to the place of its destination and it
should be dealt with according to the laws and customs of that
place. . . . If property is situate in any place and is intended
to remain there permanently, it is deemed to be attached to that
place in the same way as immovables. "02
It is interesting to interject at this point the observation
that the European legal writers to whom Story resorted would
seem to be those who insisted that the maxim "Mobilia perso2zam
seqiutntur" applied always, and Story himself seems to have
advocated that view. 3 The conclusion of the Spanish writers,
after considering the views of Italian and French commentators,
was that there should not be a complete subservience to that
maxim on every occasion.
"Let us then decide," Mlatienzo continues, "with regard
to movable property acquired during marriage that it is shared
between husband and wife if it is situate in a place where there
is in force a custom to this effect, or alternatively, if it was in-
tended by the acquiring spouse to be taken to such a place even
though it was at the time of the marriage [when acquired]
actually situate at Cordova or in some other place where no such
custom is in force. ' 64
Lest it be assumed that an easy division existed between
what were movables and what were immovables, it may be added
that Matienzo, Covarruvias and others distinguished between
such matters as rents of a temporary nature which were to be
considered as movables, and various other rights and interests in
land which were to be reckoned as immovable property.65
The question of what law governed the spouses' property
rights in debts and causes of action has already been mentioned
in a preceding part of this article. G Such rights, it may be re-
Matienzo, No. 79.
Matienzo, No. 80.
Story, secs. 379, 380.
Matienzo, No. 81.
Matienzo, Nos. 82, 83.
See supra, note 35.
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peated, were determinable by the law of the place where the
debt or right of action was enforceable. 6t
In this country the problem of determining the spouses'
rights in the marital property under the properly applicable
law is complicated by ease in changing, and the frequent tend-
ency to change, the matrimonial domicile and innumerable cases
have arisen upon this problem. 8 Even back a hundred years
or more one finds a considerable number of cases in Louisiana
and Texas based upon this problem.69 Occasionally, one of these
older cases was decided on the basis of the application of the
Spanish law or on a case which had in turn applied such law.t 0
It is somewhat interesting to note, therefore, the discussion by
Aratienzo of situations where the spouses changed to a new domi-
cile, whether immediately subsequent to the marriage ceremony
or whether some time thereafter.
Mlust regard be had, he asked, to the law of the place where
the marriage was contracted, or to the law of the place of the
husband's domicile (if that was other than the place of mar-
riage), or to the law of the place to which they remove after
the marriage (being other than the husband's former place of
domicile), or to the law of the place where acquired property is
situate 71
Some consideration has already been given to the last men-
tioned question of the situs of property. Leaving aside that
question, let us consider the absence of any express agreement
between the spouses as to how marital acquisitions should be
divided. "If," said Mlatienzo, "the laws enacted or the customs
adopted, with regard to the sharing or division of property
acquired during marriage, or with regard to anything else, differ
in the place of the husband's domicile from those in force in the
place where the marriage was contracted, the law to be observed
is that of the husband's domicile. . . ." The foregoing applied,
however, only "in a ease where the husband makes the marriage
"Matienzo, No. 85.
"'See BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Sec. 289.1 et seq.; Leflar,
Community Property and Conflict of Laws (1923) 21 CALIF. L. REV.
221; Stumberg, Marital Property and Conflict of Laws (1932) 11
TEx. L. REV. 53; Note (1930) 43 HARV. L. REv. 1286.
' See STORY, CONFLICT Or LAWS (5th ed. 1857) Chap. VI.
,"See, e.g. Saul v. His Creditors, 6 Mart. N.S. (La.) 569, 16 Am.
Dec. 212 (1827).
7'Matienzo, No. 66.
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contract as a foreigner in the place of his wife's domicile with-
out intending to stay and remain there and with the intention
of returning at once to the place where he is domiciled and re-
sides. In such a case it is natural to have regard to the customs,
not of the place where the marriage is contracted, but of the
place to which they betake themselves. . . .The case is different,
however, if they make the contract of marriage with intent that
they should reside as husband and wife in the place of the wife's
domicile where the marriage contract was made. In that case,
as the husband intends to live with his wife in the place of her
domicile, the laws of her domicile must be followed." Similarly,
if the parties did not intend to make their domicile that of the
place of contracting marriage but did not intend to remove to
the husband's domicile and instead to go to some third place of
residence to make their residence or domicile, it was presumed,
according to Miatienzo, that the parties contracted the marriage
with intent to follow the laws of the new domicile intended by
them.7 2 Judge Story followed the same view, it may be noticed,
in defining the matrimonial domicile to be "the domicile of the
husband, if the intention of the parties be to fix their residence
there; and of the wife, if the intention is to fix their residence
there; and if the residence is to be in some other place, as in
New York, then the matrimonial domicile would be in New
York.'"73 Of course, if the husband intends to reside at the
wife's domicile, this becomes his domicile so that it is really the
husband's domicile that continues to control.
But suppose that although the parties intend to and do re-
move to the place of the husband's domicile after being mar-
ried elsewhere, they enter into a contract or agreement at the
place of marriage which is designed to govern their rights in
the marital property? Even though their agreement encom-'
passes matters permitted by the law of the place of marriage, if
it con'templates anything contrary to the law of the husband's
domicile-and hence the matrimonial domicile-it will certainly
come in conflict with the public policy of the latter domicile.
However, so far as the Spanish law was concerned there would
seem to be little likelihood of public policy becoming involved.
Matienzo, Nos. 70, 71.
7 STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws (8th ed.) sec. 194.
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Under the Spanish law of community property1 4 as under the
present French Civil Code,75 it was possible for spouses to con-
tract that earnings and gains acquired during the marriage
should be governed by some other arrangement than by the pro-
visions of the community property law. Since such an agreement
would be recognized if made under the Spanish law of commu-
nity property, it would not be against public policy to recognize
such an agreement entered into elsewhere. "If in the marriage
contract there is an express agreement that such property is to
go in whole or in part to one spouse or to the other or to both of
them, such an agreement must be observed and all distinctions
of places or customs are irrelevant. For such agreements are not
contrary to good morals and indeed are actually approved of by
our laws."' 70 Admittedly the situation might be otherwise in a
province of Spain such as Cordova-instanced by -atienzo-or
Valencia or Miajorca where, for some period of time, a system
of separate property prevailed. Would one of those provinces
recognize or give effect to a contract by its domiciliaries where
such contract provided for community of property between the
spouses? One may here consider Law 24 of Partida 4, Title 3,
of Las Siete Partidas of 1263, which provided that when a man
and woman married, making an agreement as to the manner in
which they should hold property earned by them during mar-
riage and thereafter went to live in another country having
customs contrary to that of the agreement, the agreement should
be given effect. The Partidas, Llamas y Molina pointed out,
overrode local customs. 77 (This view, although later accepted, is
not borne out by the provision of the code itself.)78
It must be noted, however, that this Law 24 was interpreted
to apply to the situation where husband and wife married in a
jurisdiction wherein they intended at the time to make their
domicile and then subsequently determined to change their domi-
" As early as the year 693, the Fuero Juzgo provided that, "And
as to earned property as to which they shall make written contract,
each shall have such share as the written contract stipulates."
FUERO JuzGo, Book 4, Title 2, Law 17. See also DE FuNIAK, PRIN-
CIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY, sec. 135.
CODE CIVIL, sec. 1400 et seq., sec. 1497 et seq.
Matienzo, No. 67.
LLAMAS Y MOLINA, COMENTARIO A LAS LEYES DE TORO, Nos. 23,
24, to Law 15.
" See supra, text and note 16.
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cile to some other place.7 0 It should also be mentioned here that
the law in question also provided that if the spouses entered into
no express agreement, they were to be presumed to have con-
tracted marriage with the law of their then domicile in mind.80
This brings us to another matter for consideration. Spouses
marry in the place of their domicile, having at that time every
intention of remaining there. They make an express contract
as to what their respective rights shall be in the marital prop-
erty, a contract sanctioned by the law of their domicile. Or they
make no express contract, but, as it is usually deemed, impliedly
contract with the law of their then domicile in mind. Later on,
they change their domicile to another jurisdiction having differ-
ent laws as to marital property rights. What are their respective
rights in the marital property acquired up to the time of the
change of domicile? That is, will their rights be deemed by their
new domicile to have become fixed in the property as determined
by the law of their former domicile? What law will govern their
rights, iii. property -acquired in the new domicile? As to their
rights'in the property acquired before their change of domicile,
it seems, pretty,,universally recognized that their rights are fixed
in: the-property,. according to the laws of their domicile when
the property was acquired there, and their rights therein will
continue to be,-recognized even when they take the property to
their new domicil. There are innumerable cases of this sort in this
country, wherein rights once fixed in property are continued to
be recognized in other jurisdictions which, having contrary laws,
would have attributed other or different rights in the property if
it had been acquired by the spouses while domiciled there.8 '
There is, though, diversity of opinion as to the law to govern
property rights in property acquired in the new domicile. This
is so well known that it is probably presumptuous to mention it.
The English courts, in the De Nicols cases,82 have held that
spouses married while domiciled in France and impliedly con-
tracting that their marital property rights should be governed by
French law were entitled to have that law govern their marital
Matienzo, No. 73.
See text, post, for translation of Law 24.
"'See BEALE, CON-IaCT OF LAWS, sec. 289.1 et seq.
IDe Nicols v. Curlier, [1900] A.C. 21; In re De Nicols, [1900] 2
Ch. 410.
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property acquired in England after they changed their domicile
to England. The same thing has been held in Ontario with re-
spect to spouses married in Quebec and subsequently changing
their domicile to Ontario. s 3 In this country, howover, it has been
uniformly held that such an implied contract does not have effect
to extend to and overreach the contrary laws of a new domi-
cile.s1 Even in the case of an express contract there has been
disinclination to consider that it was intended to cover a change
of domicile-N
Turning to the Spanish law, we find Law 24 of the Partidas,
referred to above, reading as follows:
"It often happens that when a husband and wife marry,
that they agree with one another, that when one of them dies the
other shall inherit the marriage gift or donation brought by
either to the marriage or they jointly agree in what manner they
shall hold the property which they earn while married. Aud
after they are married they go to live in another country in
which is practiced a custom contrary to that of the agreement
or contract which they made. And because there may be doubt
when one of them dies, whether the agreement they made be-
tween them, before or when they married, should govern, or the
custom of the country to which they moved should govern, to
that end we shall explain. And we say that the agreement they
had made before or at the time of their marriage ought to have
its effect in the manner they may have stipulated, and that it
will not be avoided by the custom of the place to which they have
removed. And so we say it ought to be, if they had not entered
into any agreement; for the custom of the country where they
contracted the marriage ought to have its effect as regards the
dowry, the marriage gift, and the earnings they may have made;
and not that of the place to which they have removed. s"8 6
In the Louisiana case of Saul v. His Creditors,sT which had
Beaudoin v. Trudel, [1937] 1 Dom. Law Rep. 216.
See Leflar, Community Property and Conflict of Laws (1933)
21 CALIF. L. REV. 221, 223; Harding, Matrimonial Domicile and
Marital Rights in Movables (1932) 30 MICH. LAw REV. 859.
' See, e.g., Hoefer v. Probasco, 80 Okla. 261;, 196 -Pac. 138 (1921),
reviewing many of the cases; Castro v. Illies, 22 Tex. 479, 73 Am.
Dec. 277 (1858).
Original and translation, see DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COM-
MUNITY PROPERTY, vol. 2, Appendix I, C.
"' 6 Mart. N.S. (La.) 569, 16 Am. Dec. 212 (1827).
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to be decided under applicable Spanish law, Judge Porter inter-
preted Law 24 and the commentaries of Matienzo and other
jurisconsults to apply only to property earned or acquired in
the old domicile before the change of domiciles is made. That is,
the new domicile must give effect to the express or implied agree-
ment so far as concerned property acquired in the old domicile
and in their hands in the new domicile. But, Judge Porter de-
termined, the Spanish law did not intend to require the new
domicile to give effect to such agreement to the extent of mak-
ing it cover property acquired in the new domicile having differ-
ent marital property laws.
It is true, as Judge Porter insisted, that Matienzo fully
recognized and discussed the fact that the laws of one jurisdic-
tion have no extraterritorial effect so as to determine property
rights in property in another jurisdiction. Property in the
forum, for example, is governed by the law of the forum and
not by the'laws of some other jurisdiction. But suppose the
forum is willing to have parties living elsewhere contract that
they will have their rights in property in the forum governed
by the law of their place of contracting? That would appear
to me to be the effect of Law 24 and Matienzo's commentaries
thereon. The question becomes somewhat academic so far as
Louisiana itself is concerned, since local statutes now put
Louisiana in line with all the other American states and pro-
vide that nonresidents moving to Louisiana shall have their
rights in property there acquired governed by the same law as
applies to other inhabitants of the state.88
In the foregoing discussion, in giving some picture of cer-
tain pertinent conflict of laws matters such as domicile, juris-
diction of courts, and tort, contract and property situations, in
the old Spanish jurisprudence, it is believed that the most
relevant subjects have been touched on. It is to be hoped that
these will provide some interesting points of comparison be-
tween that jurisprudence and the jurisprudence of other
European countries, especially as the Spanish writers have here-
tofore been generally ignored. It is also to be hoped that interest
in these writers will be stimulated. There are many very ex-
cellent legal writers and commentators among the Spanish school
whose works are as yet virtually untapped by American scholars.
ss LA. CIV. CODE, art. 2401.
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Investigation of the Spanish writers and the Spanish codes will
reveal an astonishing amount of material that is modern by our
standards. A general survey of the entire subject is -well worthy
of treatment at book length. Meanwhile, this article may serve
to introduce, however concisely, some idea of conflict of laws
in that jurisprudence.
